In the context of research into environmental aesthetics, the response to landscape preference has been considered as an intermediate variable, a conceptual link between the processes of environmental perception and the affective experience of the landscape (Kaplan,1987). As a consequence of this, the analysis of this variable has been configured as a thematic space of great interest for research into the cognition-affect relationship. There has long been contention between the authors who argue that the preference for stimuli may develop (although not always) in the absence of any cognitive processing of these stimuli (Zajonc, 1980) and those that argue that the affective responses are primarily post-cognitive phenomenon (Lazarus 1982). The theoretical models that have been presented in the area of landscape preference research have tended to group around these positions. There are in fact two main explicatory frameworks that have enabled the development of clearly differentiated testable hypotheses, based on conceptual proposals that have traditionally been considered divergent: (i) the informational model of environmental preference by Kaplan and Kaplan (Kaplan 1987; Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989), which is closer to the thesis of Zajonc (1980); (ii) the proposals known as the preference-for-prototype (Whitfield, 1983) and preference-for-differences models (Purcell et al., 1998), conceptually linked, explicitly or implicitly, to the most traditional cognitive approaches to affect.