FIVE ACCOUNTS OF PERCEPTION:
A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE LITERATURE OF LANDSCAPE QUALITY

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SUMMARY
Landscapes must be perceived before their visual qualities may be appreciated, yet in the literature of landscape quality there is no agreement concerning the nature of landscape perception. In this paper, five "accounts of perception" are introduced in turn, and their validity discussed. It is proposed that whereas the first four accounts have some limited validity, only the fifth account is able to provide an adequate explanation of landscape experience, by acknowledging the intelligence and purposefulness of human perception.

INTRODUCTION
In a recent issue of Landscape Research, Philip Dearden graphically summed up Landscape Evaluation as "an intellectual battlefield.... with quite appropriately 'Need for Results' occupying one corner and 'No Theoretical Basis' firmly ensconced in the other [1]. It seems a fair summary. The present paper attempts to add to the debate by contributing a personal selection of observations and ideas relating to landscape perception, with some support from the literature of psychology.

Interest in landscape perception has been largely motivated by a desire to explain landscape preferences, which has in turn found practical application in methods of landscape evaluation. Thus the terms "landscape perception" and "landscape preference" have become closely intertwined, to the extent that discussions purporting to be of perception often turn out to be analyses of preferences. I suggest that on the contrary there is much merit in distinguishing the two prior to attempting to identify valued landscapes, it seems necessary to ask how landscapes are perceived.

Many of those people most enthusiastically involved with landscape quality appear to work within some particular frame of reference, put forward often with scant justification, as if it were self-evident. Thus for example some authors and researchers analyse the visual patterns made by particular scenes, while others consider the historical antecedents of modern landscape tastes. The resulting papers differ in method, language and even in appearance on the printed page to an extent that makes their conclusions difficult to compare.
In the following numbered sections, I attempt to distinguish five
"accounts" of our perception of the world - and landscapes in
particular - which I believe may implicitly underlie some of this
diversity. It is suggested that the first four accounts have only
limited validity: each is only a partial explanation of perception.
The fifth account provides a framework for perception that
embraces and reconciles some aspects of the earlier accounts. It
would be too optimistic to hope that this one paper could produce
a similar reconciliation of the diverse approaches themselves, but
hopefully it may indicate that there is a framework for debate in
which underlying assumptions may be compared.

(1) LANDSCAPE AS FORM AND COLOUR IN TWO DIMENSIONS

There is no doubt that from time to time we find ourselves looking
at some object with an awareness of colour, not as a property of
the object, but as a detached sensation. This kind of awareness has
in the past led a number of philosophers sharing a concern for
knowledge and truth to propose that the products of visual perception
are invariably nothing more than patterns of colour in two
dimensions, patterns the parts of which possess direction in space,
but lack depth. All other properties that we attribute to the real
world, such as distance and solidity, must then be explained as
inferences based on experience. Thus in 1709 we find Berkeley
writing:

Looking at an object, I perceive a certain visible figure
and colour, with some degree of faintness and other
circumstances, which from what I have formerly observed,
determine me to think that if I advance forward so many paces
or miles, I shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch;
so that in truth and strictness of speech, I see neither
distance itself nor anything that I take to be at a distance (1).

Is this a valid account of perception? From time to time we do
actually attend to something like pure sensations, particularly of
colour. There are occasions when the evening light on a distant
field of wheat can make the crop appear to have a pinkish glow quite
unlike the usual golden colour. The effect can be momentarily quite
startling, particularly when the light comes from behind the
observer, although the illusion diminishes as one approaches the
field, or when other objects in the view take up the same colour. A
different kind of visual drama is produced by sunlight peering
through the leaves of a tree, viewed from below. Objects are
normally seen by reflected light, which enables us to attribute
surface colour; transmitted light foil's this judgment. Both these
effects depend as much on surprise as on the quality of the colour
in itself. Mist and fog can render objects unrecognisable, and for
a time we may see only forms. Extreme distance combines some of
these effects, distorting colours and accentuating form.
Despite these examples, this account, which draws the boundary between seeing and thinking as a point which attributes the whole of intelligence to the latter, is no longer fashionable among philosophers or psychologists, and runs counter to most everyday experience. Most of the time, our surroundings appear very unlike a flat sheet and no inferences are required to see distances or solidity. At any instant, the eyes are focused within a relatively small volume of space, and repeated fixations give us a three-dimensional perception of our surroundings by processes which are effortless and immediate. Neither individual fixations, nor the perceptions which they construct have much in common with flat pictures.

A more usual mode of perception is suggested by the following observations.

(2) LANDSCAPE AS FORM AND COLOUR IN THREE DIMENSIONS

If a circular coin is viewed at an angle, it produces a perspective image which is not circular, but elliptical. Despite this, we infer that the coin that we see is circular. This process, so automatic that we are rarely aware of it, is commonly known as "shape constancy". Similarly, objects of a fixed size at different distances from the observer - such as posts in a fence - will almost invariably be interpreted as being of equal size, despite the perspective shrinking as distance increases. This phenomenon is commonly called "size constancy". Other constancies include "lightness constancy", which refers to the ability to judge the reflectance of surfaces despite changes in the quantity of incident light, and "colour constancy", which is the ability to judge surface colours consistently despite fairly severe changes in the spectrum of incident light.

The conditions required to trigger these constancies are minimal. A scrap of paper lying across a shadow on its own provides more than enough information to place nearby surfaces in context. It is not surprising, therefore, that the constancies are relatively difficult to "switch off", except under special viewing conditions such as those described in the previous section. Squinting may help; another rather contrived method is to inspect unacceptably small parts of the field of view through a cardboard tube. Otherwise, when faced with a complex scene, it requires a special and unusual effort of attention to see the "look" of objects rather than the objects themselves. Archaeology (3) testifies to the difficulty experienced by art students who find that they must learn to see in this way.

The consideration of phenomena such as these strongly suggests that human visual perception is dedicated to providing us with an understanding of the world as a three-dimensional and stable environment. That this should be so is hardly surprising; our ability to cope with and profit from our surroundings even at the humblest level is dependent upon our recognition of the contact and reliable properties of objects, however they may present themselves. In this
account of perception, the world is made up of solid objects, possessing distance and intrinsic form, lightness and surface colour. For a computer, a comparable act of pattern recognition would be sophistication indeed, yet even this act falls far short of the full intelligence of human perception.

(3) LANDSCAPE AS "MENTAL MAP"

In an earlier section, it was noted that a series of fixations is required to build up a knowledge of one's immediate surroundings. Given that we have this effortless ability to combine the fragmentary visual input resulting from moving the head and eyes alone, it is not surprising that, with a little more effort, we are able also to co-ordinate the more extensive input that results from moving bodily through our surroundings, as when we explore a house, a garden, a city, or a landscape. The resulting spatial knowledge is conveniently called, by geographers, planners and others, a "mental map"; we may infer the existence of such maps from the fact that we are able to plan long-distance journeys through familiar landscapes similar in many ways to those we would make in unknown territory, following a printed map. The construction of mental maps does not require a sophisticated understanding of the terrain. Heissner recounts the behaviour of a boy of fifteen months who was able to find a pile of biscuits recently spilled in a nearby room (4). Parents will note that the only exceptional feature of this case lies in its being reported by a psychologist.

The environment of which we are aware extends all around us: in front, to the sides and behind. The image instantaneously present to the eye does not stand apart from this awareness; even at the instant, this image is being assimilated into the awareness of the larger scene. We are rarely aware of the severe optical limitations of this instantaneous image, so that when an artist attempts to reveal its nature to us in a sketch, the result appears bizarre (5). What we see, according to this account of perception, is the whole environment of which we are aware, both what is visible, and what we know to be around the perception.

(4) LANDSCAPE AS PLACE WITH "DEEP STRUCTURE"

One objection that is sometimes raised against landscape evaluation is that the landscape itself is never constant; indeed the very variations of weather, daylight and seasons - one needs almost to emphasise this in so prosaic a manner - are in themselves a source of pleasure, a subject for contemplation. A brief research note may be in order here. To investigate the effects of varying daylight and season, the writer took photographs from six varied viewpoints at three times on a sunny day, on a dull day, and at three times of the year. These were later assessed, using nine verbal scales, by 72 members of the public recruited in a Yorkshire town. The central, important result to emerge was that while each of the six landscape settings were given very significantly different ratings on all nine scales, the effects of
varying daylight and season were significant for only two scales out of the nine. In particular, the "attractiveness" assessments of the six settings did not differ measurably between the conditions of early morning sun, midday sun, evening sun, overcast sky, autumn leaves or deep snow.

It is of course possible that, for each setting, the varying images captured on the six occasions by chance all made equally attractive patterns of colour and form, either in two or three dimensions, and that the same coincidence holds true for the other six scales showing no differences. I prefer however to explain this result in terms of a further property of perception which, by analogy with the previous discussion, might be called "place constancy". While this form of constancy goes beyond those so far recognised in the psychology of visual perception, it is, I suggest, entirely reasonable that such a constancy should exist, and furthermore, as with the preceding constancies, it may be argued that such a constancy must exist because we cannot properly explain everyday language and behaviour without it.

More so than the other constancies, place constancy depends upon experience. We can attribute constant identity only when we have some understanding of both the constant and the changing features of particular types of places. Changes to the landscape brought about by changes in the weather are, in this country, frequent enough to be all too familiar. Changes brought about by the seasons are slower, yet anyone able to use words such as "arable" and "moorland" correctly is surely demonstrating "place constancy". Of course, permanent, dramatic and unpredictable changes do occur to landscapes as to other entities, and we may say that the landscape has "changed out of all recognition", or that it is "not the same place". Such unpredictability does not negate the usefulness of concepts like "arable field", rather its recognition demands them. Language is "arable field", rather its recognition demands them. Language is correspondingly rich at this conceptual level. It is the level of practical affairs, but it is also a level at which landscape may be enjoyed.

(5) LANDSCAPE AND UNDERSTANDING

Until quite recently, mainstream psychology has considered the human individual as a package of rather loosely assembled functions. Perception, intelligence, memory, motor skills and personality have all been probed and tested more or less in isolation. Most important in the present context, perception has been considered as the passive, involuntary and unselective intake of information - information which is then passed on along a one-way channel as raw material for the more flexible and sophisticated processes of intelligent thought, or "cognition". The recognition of the visual constancies has tended to shift the boundary between passive perception and active intelligence, and the recognition of selective attention to blur it, but the boundary has remained.
Recently, this fragmentation has been strongly challenged. The model of the one-way processing channel, adequate as an explanation of the experiments for which it was also the inspiration, has been shown to be quite inadequate to explain the simplest of activities that take place beyond the laboratory door. Among the challengers is Ulric Neisser. A central theme of his book "Cognition and Reality" (6) is that perception and cognition are barely separable: much of seeing is thinking, and much of thinking is seeing.

The central idea in Neisser's account of these twin acts is that nine-tenths of seeing is guided by anticipation. We hypothesize in advance what we expect to see next, and then actively search our surroundings until either we find something that fits, or else we decide to modify the plan. Perception is thus a highly organized process of detective work. Sequences of guessing, searching and piecing together generate further sequences which run in connected cycles, unless diverted by some unexpected urgent signal, such as the ringing of a telephone, or the arrival of a bull.

Neisser explains these perceptual cycles in terms of mental schemata. Each schema is attuned to a particular kind of input, and the currently active schemata have the dual function of determining the inputs which we are ready to receive, and of directing the search for those inputs, with movements of the eyes, the head and often the feet as well. The schemata of any one individual are for the most part the products of experience (though some of the most useful are innate), and are organized into extensive memory networks. The currently active schemata are but a small fraction of the whole to which they are intimately connected.

A fully-argued statement of this theory is given in Neisser's own highly readable book: for the present, only some of its more immediately relevant consequences will be discussed. One consequence is that, in any setting, what we see depends upon our current preoccupations, plans, interests, information needs, perceptual set, call it what you will. In looking at a face, Neisser suggests, we may often see the all-important smile or read a mood without being directly aware of the creases around the eyes or the angle of the head, though these may both be present. In reading a book, we may take in the meaning without registering the words that express it, and in viewing a landscape, we may again read its meaning without registering the precise colour and form of each feature.

On occasion, we may have interests which cause us to be alive to colour, even to a very specific colour (as in looking for a particular species of flower), or no form (as when looking for somewhere to shelter). Schemata range from concrete to abstract, specific to general. Perception is inherently intelligent and economical; we do not see what we have no need to see, and for much of the time we do not need to see form or colour.
A second consequence is that little that we see remains isolated. We may bend down to view a single flower, yet unless we have the ability to suspend the habitual processes of the mind, that flower becomes a part of our understanding of the route we are walking and the landscape that surrounds it, our knowledge of wild flowers and their habitats, and much else besides.

DISCUSSION

In the above sections, I have attempted to introduce five accounts of perception, five interpretations of the act of seeing, with special reference to landscapes. This has served two purposes. Firstly I believe that these accounts represent, to a working approximation, some of the positions which explicitly or by implication have been assumed in forming evaluation methods, experiments and even theories directed at landscape values. The five accounts, therefore, form a framework by means of which these positions may be more readily identified. Secondly, in the above introductions, an earlier account has occasionally been criticized in order to clarify a later account. The following discussion is motivated by both of these purposes.

The account of perception as producing two-dimensional patterns of form and colour has strong implications for the raw materials of landscape quality. It is of course arguable that landscape quality is inferred from two-dimensional sense-data, as Berkeley claimed that distance is inferred, but there is a clear suggestion that beauty resides in the forms and colours themselves immediately present to the eye, and dependent upon all the particular circumstances of distance, orientation and illumination. This suggestion is probably supported by an unspoken assumption that the appreciation of landscape is but one manifestation of an "esthetic" response, dependent upon good composition and satisfying colour combinations.

The second, third and fourth accounts of perception possess implications in the same way. The second account implies that the important variables are those that describe a three-dimensional world in terms of the properties of colour and form possessed by objects themselves (rather than their momentary perspective projections), but with the restriction that at least a part of each object is potentially visible from a single viewpoint. The choice of this viewpoint has some influence on the resulting description (but not as much as for the previous account), by determining what features are currently visible.

The necessity for a viewpoint is eliminated in the third account, by the argument that we are able to infer, and carry around in our heads, representations of places in which are independent of any one viewpoint. This mode implies that, for landscapes familiar to us by exploration, the important variables are as for the second account (or alternatively as for the fourth account), with the difference that the
only relevance of location is of one feature relative to another. This revision, trivial though it might at first appear, has the effect of posing the rather thorny question: how large, psychologically, are our surroundings? - since visibility is no longer available as a criterion, and an object's being out of sight is no longer a guarantee that it will be out of mind. In the language of visual impact analysis, this question becomes: what is the zone of influence of a feature? He will briefly return to this question later when considering "view": a full answer is not attempted in this paper.

The fourth account of perception adds the extra effect of "place constancy". Although in other respects similar to the third account, the appropriate description of the landscape is no longer in terms of objects possessing form, colour and relative location, but in terms of trees, hedgerows, fields, land-use categories and the like. It may be no accident that this is in some ways an easier description to compile.

The implications of the fifth account are not to be revealed so easily. If, as has been suggested, perception is guided by the observer's current plans and preoccupations, then one may identify the raw materials of landscape quality only by examining the plans and preoccupations that people carry with them into the countryside.

Especially when we find ourselves in new surroundings, a part of our perception is directed towards guiding our own movements and behaviour. Roger Barker, in his book "Ecological Psychology", has described some of the forces that cause people's behaviour to be more readily predicted by knowing where they are than who they are. These forces may be physical, as when behaviour is restricted or at least suggested by the layout of walls and furniture, or, in the landscape, by ground underfoot, by hedges and fences, branches and brambles, paths, ditches, rivers and hills. There may additionally be social forces due to the presence, actual or potential, of other people who, through their own roles, plans and authorities, together with our willingness to confine, exercise a degree of control over our behaviour.

These forces are themselves a part of the perception and experience of a setting, often a means through which it may be experienced. In some settings which demand intense involvement there may be room in consciousness for little else; thus Dumph describes a child's experience in a school playground as:

not just playground, but "playgrounding". His sub-environment here is not just handball court, but behaviour of others and himself creating a handball game. The game action, with its court, is the pupil's actual environment (7).
A considerable number of people engage in activities - professional, agricultural, sporting and others - which demand much involvement. For no very good reason, theorists tend to ignore their landscape experiences, even though these will certainly involve specialised and discriminating perception. Perhaps this is because most of us typically experience landscape in a more leisurely fashion, which allows individuals to play out mental plans of extreme variety, the nature of which frequently cannot be inferred from overt behaviour. Some of these plans may be dependent upon the surrounding landscape, centred around interests, casual or profound, in nature, wildlife, seasonal changes, rural buildings, farming methods and much else in addition. Again, the perception of the landscape can only validly be described in terms of the language of those interests, a language only occasionally reducible to descriptions of forms and colours.

Finally, we may carry with us mental plans quite unrelated to landscape, and indeed it may be one of the appeals of landscape that it provides a relief from more coercive surroundings, and opportunities to reflect, whether on problems or pleasures.

It can justifiably be argued from what has already been said that everybody sees a different landscape, and some writers have used this to deny a priori that there could ever be even a limited degree of consensus concerning landscape values. However, this argument can easily be taken too far. There clearly exists, over and above personal and particular interests, a level of understanding which is manifest as beliefs concerning local landscapes, English landscapes, and even the whole of the natural world. These beliefs possess their own emotional charge, which though different from more immediate pleasures, is no less potent. They also possess a generality which enables them persist even when the landscape is not physically present. Lincoln Allison seems to be making this point in this passage describing what he calls "the Fallacy of the Active Want" (8).

... an interesting example is to be found in the way in which county planning authorities have tried to evaluate rural areas by measuring how many people go there ... The fallacy lies in thinking that the only kind of benefit man can get from anything must be from actually using it. But it seems to me that this must always be an under-evaluation. When a thing is important to us, we get pleasure from it actually being there ... men love the physical being of their country without necessarily doing anything about it.

These beliefs I suggest, concern what the landscape is, what it should be, how it should be managed, changed, and in particular, conserved. They are as readily communicated by words, through books, magazines and newspapers, as by field visits, photographs or sketches. Outrage at the latest by-pass or power station may be as readily experienced through the pages of a newspaper read on the commuter train as in the field. The content of these beliefs is difficult to define, but they include, for the English, a love of
the natural, the unique, the old, the historical (9), ambivalent feelings towards modern values and life-styles, and a suspicion of the politics and morality of Gross National Product. Anything perceived as peculiarly English is liable to acquire a rosy glow and a penumbra of mythology if threatened, whether it be the Imperial pint, or fish and chips, and some landscape beliefs may be sharpened by the sense that the very character of the English countryside is under threat. Being thus beyond the capacity of the individual to verify or refute, beliefs of this kind easily become a fashion - which is not to deny the real need for concern, or the sincerity of individuals - to which it is difficult not to subscribe.

It is an odd fact perhaps that people are more uniform in their unverifiable beliefs than in many other respects. This, I suggest, may be the very legitimate reason why several surveys have reported a high degree of agreement between the landscape assessments of individuals interviewed at random. If a well-dressed interviewer approaches you with a clipboard and a sheaf of landscape photographs for assessment, it is reasonable to assume that he or she requires a considered response that is personal to a degree, yet uncoloured by passing preoccupations, and that the subjects for assessment are the landscapes depicted, rather than the photographs themselves. Both of these assumptions may be confirmed by explicit instructions. If so, you may well respond by revealing preferences that reflect beliefs of the kind described. In fact, if you hold these beliefs with conviction, you would probably not wish to respond in any other way. Any suggestion that you should attend to photographic style or unusual lighting might be taken as an indication that the purpose of the interviewer was frivolous, and not even remotely relevant to the urgent task of preventing the erosion of the English landscape.

In summary, the fifth account of perception may be taken to imply that every individual would require a different description of a landscape to capture its effect. Alternatively, it is suggested that a useful description may be made that reflects the degree to which a landscape is natural, unique, old or historical; more precisely, the degree to which it conforms to current beliefs about what landscape should be like. Beliefs are not visual patterns, and such a description need not be particular visual; it could consist of a dossier of written material. However such dossiers are difficult to compile, and it may be acknowledged that the degree to which a landscape is old and, in the popular sense, natural, can to a first approximation be inferred from its component features: trees, hedgerows, farm buildings, stone walls, streams, churches, roads, pylons and all the other nameable features. The partial success of some evaluation methods that analyse landscapes into such features may be due to this fact.

So far in this paper, I have inclined towards the so-called fifth account of perception as the account that best describes most of our acts of seeing. However it would be wrong to leave this discussion

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without acknowledging the existence of ways of looking at landscape which combine the properties of two or more of the accounts of perception as given above. If a theoretical justification is required for these combinations, then we may consult Neilsen’s evidence that diverse sets of schemata may be simultaneously active; alternatively, the following perceptual double-acts once stated may hopefully be recognisable as familiar experiences.

In qualifying the first account of perception, some examples were given of circumstances in which we might find ourselves simultaneously aware of the immediate colour sensation arising from an object, and of the colour we expect it to possess. Arnhem describes similar situations in which we see both with and without constancy, and elevates them to the status of the "aesthetic attitude" of perception:

The changing appearance of a landscape or building in the morning, the evening, under electric light, with different weather and in different seasons offers two advantages. It presents an extraordinary richness of sight, and it tests the nature of the object by exposing it to varying conditions ... One sees the object unfold its identity in a multitude of appearances (10).

This description seems to combine elements of the first and fourth accounts of perception, and perhaps also the fifth as well; it may also be true that we allow ourselves to enjoy the changing appearance of a constant object only if we believe the object itself meets with our approval, or is at least unobjectionable. Elements of the first and fifth account are combined in Lowenthal’s observation that a critic who found the view of a yellow river monstrous, ‘a thing of beauty’, might have reversed his opinion had he assumed that thecolouration was natural, and not due to mining wastes (11).

A particularly important perceptual double-act is, I believe, involved in the perception of a ‘view’. Some writers (including myself) have used the convenient word ‘view’ to refer to any perspective image, yet the common usage is restricted to circumstances when the landscape seen from a given viewpoint is unusually extensive or well-known (perhaps because it has been frequently painted or photographed), or especially significant for a group of people (such as the inhabitants of a village) or household (the view from the home). Whereas the perspective image of objects close to the observer change rapidly in the course of a few steps, the arrangement of distant objects remains almost unchanged, and different observers will knowingly see almost the same pattern. Having become thus singled out, a given perspective tends to assume an existence, and a value, in its own right. A householder, or a village, may come to assume territorial rights over their special views, and resent changes and intrusions. This is where landscaping becomes significant: a belt of trees may not remove the offending sewage works from the map — including the cognitive map — but the works may nevertheless be removed from the view, and those involved may feel that honour has been satisfied. In the reification of view, there is again a hint of fifth and fifth accounts of perception.
CONCLUSIONS

This paper began with a reference to the theoretical vacuum surrounding landscape evaluation, to which we now return. Useful theories have a number of attributes: they co-ordinate a wide range of known facts; they suggest testable hypotheses, and unknown or unrecognised phenomena that can be searched out and identified; they tend to contradict other theories in the same field; and they often possess a majestic simplicity, expressable in a single sentence. But could the essence of landscape quality ever be captured in such a theory?

In this paper I have tried among other things to suggest, using rather more intuition than fact, some of the many and varied ways in which ordinary people come to attach value to landscape. The resulting analysis, incomplete though it is, may serve to demonstrate that the ways in which landscapes are ordinarily valued is not to be reduced to a concise formula. Landscape perception is too richly complex to be captured in a single statement. Instead of searching for that elusive theory, what we should be attempting is the sensitive classification of the web of perceptual plans and landscape beliefs to which we are all a party.
REFERENCES


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(9) As so ably expounded in the writings of David Lowenthal and Hugh Prince.

(10) Arneheim, ref 3, p45.

FIVE ACCOUNTS OF PERCEPTION
A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE LITERATURE OF LANDSCAPE QUALITY

Abstract
The idea that beauty in nature is governed by fundamental laws, as yet only vaguely known, has a long history. In the last twenty years, interest in the appeal of landscape has been intensified, particularly within the United Kingdom, by a sense that the landscape itself is under threat. This has led to numerous attempts to assess systematically the visual quality of landscapes, as an aid to Planning and Policy-making. The resulting literature of landscape quality, with contributions from geographers, planners, and individuals from many other disciplines, reveals a bewildering diversity. One purpose of this paper is to argue that this diversity rests upon a spectrum of fundamental assumptions, never fully identified in the landscape literature itself, about the basic nature of human perception. A classification of assumptions is proposed which, as a first approximation, consists of five "accounts of perception".

When applied to landscape, these become, in order of increasing sophistication:

1. Landscape as form and colour in two dimensions
2. Landscape as form and colour in three dimensions
3. Landscape as "mental map"
4. Landscape with "place constancy"
5. Landscape of the understanding

These five "accounts" are introduced in turn, each increase in sophistication being supported by psychological theories, experimental findings or general observations. The fifth account receives special support from Ulric Neisser's theory of perceptual "schemas".

A second purpose of the paper is to debate the validity of these accounts of perception. It is proposed that whereas the first four accounts have some limited validity, only the fifth account is able to provide an adequate explanation of a range of familiar experiences of landscape, by acknowledging the intelligence and purposefulness of human perception.

Some modes of landscape experience are described that seem voluntarily to combine two or more of the five accounts listed; while extending partial validity to the earlier accounts, it is suggested that intelligent understanding is never completely absent.

Finally, the implications for landscape theory are discussed. It is suggested that no simple laws govern landscape quality, as judged by most ordinary people, and probably by specialist experts also. Rather than search for a single unifying theory, those who wish to understand landscape quality should instead attempt to analyse and classify the various and subtle forms of encounter between people and countryside.
CINC CONSIDERACIONS SOBRE LA PERCEPCIÓ
UNA CÀLIDA PRE A LA CONFERÈNCIA DE LA QUALITAT DE LA LITERATURA DEL PAISATGE

Resum
La idea de que la bellissa a la natura està governada per lleis
conversals té una llarga història, vagament coneguda. En els últims vint
anys s'ha intensificat l'interès en l'estratègia del paisatge, particularment
a Anglaterra per la coincidència de que el paisatge estava anomenat.
Això portà a nombrosos intents de valorar sistèmicament la qualitat
visual dels paisatges, com una altra part a la planificació i les decisions.
La literatura resultant sobre la qualitat del paisatge amb contribucions
de geògrafs, planificadors i persones de moltes altres disciplines,
demuestra una diversificació desencoratjant. Un problema d'aquest treball
es comentar que aquesta diversitat es recolza sobre un espectre de
suposicions fonamentals, mai plenament identificades en la literatura
del paisatge, sobre la natura bàsica de la percepció humana. En proposa
una classificació de suposicions com a primera aproximació i consisteix
en cinc "consideracions sobre percepció". Quan aquestes són aplicades
al paisatge, emtenen en ordre de sofisticació creixent:
(1) Paisatge com forma i color en dos dimensions.
(2) Paisatge com forma i color en tres dimensions.
(3) Paisatge com "seria mental".
(4) Paisatge amb "constància de lloc".
(5) Paisatge de la comprensió.
Aquests cinc "consideracions" són introduïdes per torn, cada increment
en sofisticació està basat en teories psicobèiques, treballs
experimentals o observacions generals. La cinquena consideració rep
especial suport de la teoria de l'Ulric Neisser sobre els "sensitius"
perceptuals (perceptual "idiòmetes").
Un segon aspecte d'aquest treball es debat sobre la validesa
d'aquestes cinc consideracions de percepció. Es proposa que, vist que
les quatre primeres consideracions tenen validesa limitada, només la
cinquena consideració és capaç de proveir-nos d'una explicació
adequada del rang d'experiències familiars del paisatge, mitjançant el
conociment de la intel·ligència i els propòsits de la percepció humana.
Algunes maneres d'experiment del paisatge són descrites de manera
que semblin adequades; si combinar dos o més de les cinc consideracions
esmentades; si mantenir la validesa parcial de les primeres consideracions
es supereix que la comprensió intel·ligent es està completament absent.
Finalment, la paraula de les implicacions per a la teoria del paisatge. Es
supereix que la qualitat del paisatge no està governada per llics simples
coms persèo normalment la gent i probablement també algunes especialistes.
El que la recerca d'una sola teoria unificada, aquela que volgui
entendre la qualitat del paisatge haurien d'intentar analitzar i
classificar les diverses i subtils formes d'enconetre entre les persones
i el paisatge.
CINCO CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE LA PERCEPCIÓN:
UNA GUÍA PARA LA COMPRENSIÓN DE LA LITERATURA DEL PAISAJE

Resumen
La idea de que la belleza en la naturaleza está gobernada por leyes fundamentales, tiene una larga historia, vagamente conocida. En los últimos veinte años se ha intensificado el interés por el atractivo del paisaje, particularmente en Inglaterra, por la conciencia de que el paisaje está amenazado. Esto comporta numerosos intentos de valorar sistemáticamente la calidad visual de los paisajes, como una ayuda para la planificación y la política. La literatura resultante sobre la calidad del paisaje con contribuciones de geógrafos, planificadores y personas de muchas otras disciplinas, demuestra una diversificación desconcertante. Un primer propósito de este trabajo, es comentar que esta diversidad se apoya sobre un esquema de suposiciones fundamentales, nunca plenamente identificadas en la literatura del paisaje sobre la naturaleza básica de la percepción humana. Se propone una clasificación de suposiciones como primera aproximación, y consiste en cinco "consideraciones sobre percepción". Cuando son aplicadas al paisaje; sobrevienen en orden de sofisticación creciente:

1. Paisaje como forma y color en dos dimensiones.
2. Paisaje como forma y color en tres dimensiones.
3. Paisaje como "mundo mental".
4. Paisaje como "constancia de lugar".
5. Paisaje de la comprensión.

Estas cinco consideraciones están introducidas por turno, cada incremento en sofisticación está basado en teorías psicológicas, hallazgos experimentales y observaciones generales. La quinta consideración recibe especial apoyo de la teoría de Ulric Neisser sobre los "esquemas" perceptuales (perceptual "schemata"). Un segundo propósito de este trabajo, es disputar la validez de estas cinco consideraciones de percepción. Se propone que, visto que las primeras cuatro consideraciones tienen validez limitada, sólo la quinta consideración es capaz de proporcionar una explicación adecuada al rango de experiencias familiares del paisaje, mediante el conocimiento de la inteligencia y los propósitos de la percepción humana. Algunas formas de experiencia del paisaje están decoradas de manera que parece voluntario el combinar dos o más de las cinco consideraciones señaladas; si extendemos la validez parcial de las primeras consideraciones, se sugiere que la comprensión inteligente nunca está completamente ausente.

Finalmente, se habla de las implicaciones para la teoría del paisaje. Se sugiere que la calidad del paisaje no está gobernada por leyes simples, como pensaría normalmente la gente y probablemente también algunos especialistas. Aquellos que quieran entender la calidad del paisaje, deberán intentar analizar y clasificar las diversas y sutiles formas de encuentro entre las personas y el paisaje, más que la búsqueda de una sola teoría unificante.